Content on securing identities, accounts, privileged access, cloud systems and business environments such as Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and cloud infrastructure. We explain MFA, IAM, PAM, access reviews, privileged accounts, logging, monitoring, Zero Trust and cloud security controls.
PAM Basics: 9 Controls That Protect Privileged Accounts
PAM, or Privileged Access Management, helps protect administrator accounts, service accounts, supplier access, cloud roles and other high-risk permissions. PAM basics are not only a password vault. They are 9 practical controls: account inventory, separate admin accounts, MFA, least privilege, time-bound access, secure passwords and secrets, controlled admin workstations, logs and monitoring, and recurring access reviews.
Prepared by: CCyber Editorial Team
PAM, or Privileged Access Management, is a set of processes and controls that protect accounts with elevated permissions. This includes administrators, service accounts, IT suppliers, cloud roles, access to backup, financial systems, infrastructure, Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, VPN, databases, code repositories and production environments. The main goal of PAM is simple: one compromised account must not mean full company compromise. A basic PAM programme should include 9 controls: account inventory, separate admin accounts, MFA, least privilege, time-bound access, secure password and secret management, controlled admin workstations, logs and monitoring, and recurring access reviews with fast access removal.
July 2026
PAM stands for Privileged Access Management. In practice, it protects accounts, roles and sessions that can change system configuration, create users, delete data, disable security controls, modify infrastructure, manage backup or access critical data.
Examples of privileged access:
PAM answers: who has the highest privileges, why they have them, when they may use them, how they authenticate, whether their actions are logged and who regularly checks whether this access is still needed.
A privileged account can do much more than a normal user account. If an attacker compromises a normal employee account, the impact may be limited. If they compromise an administrator, they may add new accounts, disable MFA, change mail rules, delete backups, download data, install malware or prepare ransomware.
The biggest privileged account risks are:
IAM, or Identity and Access Management, covers general identity and access management. It applies to all users, applications, groups, roles, login, SSO, MFA, onboarding, offboarding and permissions.
PAM focuses on the highest-risk access. It applies to administrators, service accounts, cloud roles, break glass accounts, suppliers, privileged passwords, administrative sessions and actions that can change the security of the entire organization.
IAM answers: who has access to what?
PAM answers: who has access that can take over, change or stop critical systems?
You cannot protect accounts you do not know about. The first PAM control is a complete list of privileged accounts, roles and accesses.
List:
For each account, define:
Evidence to prepare: privileged account and role register with owners and last review date.
An administrator should not use the same account for daily work and administrative actions. An account used for email, internet, messaging and office work is more exposed to phishing, malware and user mistakes.
A good model:
Example: John Smith has a normal account for email and meetings, and an admin.john.smith account for administrative actions. The administrative account has stronger MFA, logs and restricted login options.
Evidence to prepare: administrator list confirming separate normal and administrative accounts.
MFA for privileged accounts is the minimum. An administrator password can be stolen, but MFA makes it harder to use the password alone to take over access.
MFA should cover:
For highest-risk roles, consider stronger methods than SMS, such as authenticator apps, hardware keys, passkeys or access conditions based on device and location.
Evidence to prepare: MFA report for privileged accounts and exception list with closure date.
An account should have only the permissions needed for a specific task. Global Administrator should not be the default solution for every administrative need.
Apply these rules:
Example: a person managing users does not need to be a Global Administrator. They can have a narrower role that allows only the required actions.
Evidence to prepare: privileged role matrix with justification and permission scope.
Standing administrative access is convenient, but risky. A better model is time-bound access: the administrator activates a role when needed, for a defined time, with justification and often with approval.
Time-bound access should cover:
Good practices:
Evidence to prepare: privileged role activation report with time, justification and approvals.
PAM is not only about people. Many risks involve service accounts, secrets, API tokens, SSH keys, database passwords and credentials used by applications.
The biggest problems:
The control should include:
Evidence to prepare: register of service accounts, secrets and privileged passwords with owner and last rotation date.
Even the best MFA is not enough if an administrator signs in to critical systems from a computer used for email, internet and private tools. Privileged accounts should be used from controlled devices and secure access paths.
Possible controls:
SMEs do not always need to start with a full privileged access workstation model. A good first step is: administration only from company-managed, secured, updated and monitored devices.
Evidence to prepare: list of allowed administrative devices and access paths for high-risk roles.
The company should know who used privileged access, when, from which device, for what reason and what actions they performed. Without logs, audit, incident response and misuse investigation are difficult.
Log and monitor:
For suppliers and critical systems, consider session recording or at least full activity logging. Logs should also be protected against modification by the same administrator whose actions are logged.
Evidence to prepare: list of PAM log sources, sample alerts and administrator activity report.
PAM does not work without regular review. Permissions accumulate. People change roles. Suppliers finish projects. Service accounts remain after old applications. That is why privileged access must be reviewed and removed regularly.
Access review should cover:
Emergency accounts, often called break glass accounts, are an important element. They are used when normal administrative access does not work, for example MFA outage or incorrect Conditional Access configuration. Emergency accounts should be few, strongly protected, monitored and used only in crisis situations.
Evidence to prepare: access review report, removed permissions list, emergency account list and usage procedure.
An SME does not need to start with a full PAM platform. Many actions can begin with existing tool configuration, simple registers, policies and recurring reviews.
Privileged access is especially important in the cloud because one role may control a subscription, project, account, database, storage, secrets, network or logs.
Suppliers often have broad access because they help maintain IT, cloud, ERP, financial systems, backup, network, OT or applications. This is convenient, but risky.
A good test: if you end cooperation with a supplier today, do you know which accounts, passwords, tokens, VPN access and roles must be disabled?
Service accounts and secrets are often weaker than human accounts. They rarely have MFA, often have long lifetimes, may be saved in scripts and sometimes nobody knows who owns them.
Many people have top roles “just in case”. This increases the risk of full organization compromise after one account is breached.
An administrative account used for email and internet is more exposed to phishing, malware and session theft.
The attacker will choose the weakest account. MFA should cover all privileged accounts and supplier remote access.
Technical accounts live for years, have broad permissions and nobody knows whether they are still needed.
A supplier has VPN, administrator password and access to many systems without end date. This is operational and audit risk.
After an incident, the company does not know who added an account, changed configuration, disabled MFA or deleted backup.
A password vault will not solve the problem if the company still has too many administrators, no access review and no supplier access rules.
The company may accidentally lock itself out of tenants, cloud or critical systems. Emergency accounts should exist, but be strongly controlled.
Employees change roles, leave the company and suppliers finish projects. Privileged access must be removed quickly and documented.
A services company has 90 employees and uses Microsoft 365, Azure, a financial system, code repositories and an external IT supplier. After a short review, it turns out there are seven Global Administrators, some administrators use the same accounts for email and system configuration, two former suppliers still have active accounts and service accounts have no owners.
The company does not start with a large PAM platform. First, it lists administrators, enables MFA, reduces Global Administrators, removes former supplier accounts and creates separate administrative accounts. Then it implements time-bound access for cloud roles, service account review, basic activation logs and access review procedure.
After 90 days, the company has fewer standing permissions, better supplier access visibility, MFA for administrators, a service account list and a board report. It is still not full enterprise PAM, but administrator account takeover risk is much lower.
ccyber.io helps companies implement PAM in a practical, staged and risk-based way. We do not start by buying a tool. We start with who has the highest permissions, why they have them, whether MFA works, whether access is standing, whether logs exist and whether someone regularly checks whether access is still needed.
We can support your organization with:
The best first step is a PAM Basics Workshop. In a short workshop, the company can identify which accounts are most risky, how many administrators exist, where MFA is missing, which accesses are standing, which service accounts require review and which quick actions reduce risk in the first 30 days.
PAM is Privileged Access Management. It covers protection of administrator accounts, service accounts, secrets, supplier access, cloud roles and administrative sessions.
No. A password vault can be part of PAM, but full PAM also includes MFA, least privilege, time-bound access, approvals, monitoring, sessions, access reviews and offboarding.
Start with administrator list, MFA, separate administrative accounts, reducing top roles, removing old supplier accounts and first access review.
Yes, for administrative actions, a separate account is recommended. The normal account is for daily work, while the administrative account is only for tasks requiring higher privileges.
Yes. Service accounts, API tokens, SSH keys and secrets often have very high privileges, so they should have an owner, minimum permissions, rotation and monitoring.
It is access granted only for the time required to complete a task. After the time ends, the role expires automatically, which reduces standing privilege risk.
They should not have standing access without justification. Supplier access should be named, time-bound, approved, protected with MFA, logged and removable quickly.
Privileged account register, MFA report, access review report, administrator list, service account list, activity logs, supplier access procedure and emergency account procedure.
PAM protects the riskiest type of company access: accounts and roles that can change configuration, delete data, disable security controls, manage backup or take over critical systems. That is why PAM should be treated as a security foundation, not an optional feature for large organizations.
PAM basics are 9 controls: account inventory, separate administrative accounts, MFA, least privilege, time-bound access, secure passwords and secrets, controlled administrative environment, logs and monitoring, and access review with strong offboarding.
The best rule is: privileged access should be rare, justified, time-bound, monitored and removed when no longer needed. Then, even if an account is attacked, the impact is much easier to contain.
Zero Trust for SMEs: A Simple Explanation
Zero Trust for SMEs does not mean buying one expensive tool. It is a practical rule: do not automatically trust a user, device, network or application just because it is “inside the company”. Every access should be verified, limited to the required role, monitored and removable. For SMEs, Zero Trust starts with MFA, access reviews, secure devices, supplier control, backup and logs.
Prepared by: CCyber Editorial Team
Zero Trust is a cybersecurity approach based on a simple rule: do not trust automatically, always verify. In practice, the company does not assume that a user, computer, phone, supplier, application or network is safe only because it belongs to the organization or connects through VPN. Every access to data and systems should be checked, limited to the minimum, policy-based, monitored and regularly reviewed. For SMEs, Zero Trust does not need to mean a large enterprise project. The best start is MFA, account cleanup, access review, administrator control, secure devices, backup, logs and response procedures.
July 2026
Zero Trust is a security approach where the company does not grant trust automatically. Every access request should be checked based on identity, device, application, location, risk, user role and resource type.
The simplest explanation:
Zero Trust does not mean you do not trust people as people. It means the system should not automatically trust any account, device or connection.
Example: an employee signs in to CRM. In a classic model, the company may assume that if the user knows the password and is on VPN, access is safe. In Zero Trust, the company asks more questions:
Zero Trust is a model where every access request is verified, permissions are minimal, risk is evaluated contextually and the company assumes that an account, device or network may be compromised.
You cannot buy “Zero Trust” as one product that solves everything. You can buy tools that support Zero Trust: MFA, Conditional Access, IAM, PAM, EDR, ZTNA, MDM, DLP, SIEM or CASB. But tools without rules and processes are not enough.
Zero Trust is not a message that “we do not trust people”. It is a message that “we do not rely only on a password, network location or good intentions”. We protect employees and the company from the impact of account takeover, phishing, malware and mistakes.
Well-implemented Zero Trust should support work, not paralyze it. The goal is the right access for the right person, from the right device, to the right resource, at the right time.
Zero Trust reduces access takeover risk, but it does not replace backup, incident response planning, training or ransomware recovery.
Small and medium companies increasingly operate as distributed organizations: remote work, cloud, SaaS applications, external IT, suppliers, personal phones, cloud folders, business accounts used outside the office, integrations and automations.
In such an environment, the old “inside the network means safe” model no longer works. The company boundary is not only the office. Data is in Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, CRM, online accounting, cloud, laptops, phones and supplier applications.
The company should check access based on multiple signals, not only a password. Signals may include user, MFA, device, location, application, risk level and data type.
Examples:
The user should have only the access needed for work. Not “just in case”, not “because they needed it once”, not “because it is easier”.
Examples:
Zero Trust assumes that an account, device or network may be compromised. Therefore, the company should limit impact, monitor actions, segment access and have a response plan.
Examples:
You cannot implement Zero Trust if the company does not know who has access to what. The first step is a simple environment map.
List:
Evidence to prepare: simple list of users, devices, applications, suppliers and critical data.
MFA is the most important first Zero Trust step for SMEs. A password can be stolen, but MFA makes it harder to use the password alone to take over an account.
MFA should cover:
Evidence to prepare: MFA report and list of accounts without MFA with plan to close exceptions.
Administrative accounts are the riskiest. If an attacker compromises a normal account, the impact may be limited. If they compromise an administrator, they may change configuration, add users, disable controls and access data.
Check:
Evidence to prepare: administrator report and decisions to reduce roles.
Zero Trust requires access to be justified and current. An access review shows who has access to data, applications and roles, and whether that access is still needed.
Review first:
Evidence to prepare: access review report with decisions: keep, reduce, remove, expire.
Zero Trust is not only about the user. The device is part of the decision too. A company laptop with updates and encryption is not the same as a personal computer without control.
Device minimum:
Evidence to prepare: device list, update status, encryption status and endpoint protection status.
VPN is not automatically secure. In many companies, VPN creates a false sense of security: once connected, the user has too much network access.
Check:
Evidence to prepare: remote access report and VPN user list.
Zero Trust should protect not only systems, but data. In SMEs, the biggest risk often involves cloud folders, customer files, contracts, HR data, finance and technical documentation.
Check:
Evidence to prepare: review of access to sensitive data and sharing links.
Zero Trust assumes that you must observe what is happening. Without logs, the company does not know whether an account was compromised, whether someone downloaded files or whether an administrator made an unusual change.
Minimum monitoring:
Evidence to prepare: list of log sources and basic high-risk alerts.
Suppliers are part of the Zero Trust model. External IT, software house, agency, integrator or consultant should not have unlimited access only because they are a “trusted partner”.
Supplier rules:
Evidence to prepare: supplier register with access to systems and data.
Zero Trust limits incident impact, but it does not remove the need for response. The company should know what to do if an account is compromised, a laptop is lost, ransomware encrypts files or a supplier reports an incident.
Minimum:
Evidence to prepare: response plan and tabletop exercise report.
Start with email, administrators, banking, CRM, cloud, hosting, domain, backup and financial systems.
Legacy protocols and sign-in methods may bypass MFA. Check them especially in email and Microsoft 365.
Keep only the administrators who truly need the role. Use stronger MFA and reviews for high-risk roles.
Former employees, interns, contractors and suppliers should not remain in systems after cooperation ends.
Review access to customer data, finance, HR, backup, cloud and critical applications.
Device inventory, updates, encryption, endpoint protection and response to lost laptops are basic controls.
Check public links, shared folders and guest access to cloud documents.
A supplier should have a named account, MFA, access scope, owner and end date.
Backup should be separated, tested and protected from deletion by a compromised administrator account.
Collect logs for sign-ins, role changes, mail rules, administrator actions and file sharing.
The most common SME Zero Trust scenario is a compromised account. The company must quickly block the account, revoke sessions and check access scope.
Zero Trust is not a one-time project. Every quarter, check MFA, accounts, administrators, guests, suppliers, devices, backup and logs.
For many SMEs, Zero Trust starts in Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace. This is where email, files, meetings, identities, guests and applications live.
In cloud, Zero Trust means that access to resources should not be standing, excessive or based on long-term keys without control.
In SMEs, the IT supplier often has broad access to email, devices, servers, backup, cloud and business systems. This is convenient, but risky.
Backup is part of Zero Trust thinking because you assume an account, server or network may be compromised. An attacker may try to delete or encrypt backups.
The most important rule: a person who can manage normal systems should not automatically be able to delete all backups.
A tool can help, but without an owner, policies, access review and evidence, the company does not implement Zero Trust. It only buys another license.
VPN gives network access, but it does not always limit access to specific applications and data. VPN without MFA, segmentation and logging may increase risk.
The attacker chooses the weakest account. MFA should cover everyone, and administrators should have stronger protection.
Suppliers often have more access than employees. Lack of supplier control contradicts practical Zero Trust.
Zero Trust without regular access review becomes outdated quickly. Permissions accumulate and stop matching real duties.
If the company has no logs, it does not know whether Zero Trust works. It also does not know what happened after account takeover.
An SME does not need to start with a full enterprise architecture. It is better to implement 10 basic controls than plan a perfect model for a year.
Zero Trust changes sign-in and access. Employees should understand that additional verification protects their work, customers and the company.
A services company has 45 employees. It uses Microsoft 365, CRM, online accounting, cloud drive, external IT provider and several SaaS applications. The company has VPN and believes that access is secure because of it.
After a short review, it turns out that MFA works only for some users, there are five Global Administrators, two former suppliers still have guest accounts, public file links have been active for months and backup can be deleted by the same administrator who manages Microsoft 365.
The company does not start with a large project. In the first 30 days, it enables MFA, removes old accounts, reduces administrators and checks backup. In the next 60 days, it performs access review, organizes supplier access, secures devices and enables alerts for unusual sign-ins. After 90 days, it has the first Zero Trust dashboard for the board.
The result: the company still uses the same tools, but access is better controlled. One account takeover no longer gives such broad access, suppliers do not have standing permissions, and the board sees measurable progress.
ccyber.io helps SMEs implement Zero Trust in a practical and staged way. We do not start from theory or tool purchasing. We start from what reduces risk the most: MFA, accounts, administrators, permissions, suppliers, devices, backup and logs.
We can support your organization with:
The best first step is a Zero Trust Discovery Workshop. In a short workshop, the company can identify the biggest access risks, critical accounts and systems, quick actions and a realistic roadmap without wasting budget.
Yes. A small company also uses email, cloud, suppliers, laptops, CRM and customer data. Zero Trust helps reduce the impact of account takeover, phishing, ransomware and excessive permissions.
Not at the start. Many actions can begin with features already available in Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, cloud and endpoint tools. First organize rules, accounts and access.
Start with MFA, a list of users and administrators, inactive account removal, access review, supplier control, backup and basic logs.
No. VPN can be part of remote access, but it does not equal Zero Trust. MFA, access limitation, policies, logs, device control and access reviews are needed.
The traditional model often trusted the internal network. Zero Trust assumes the network may be untrusted, and every access should be verified and limited.
No. Zero Trust reduces access risk, but backup is still needed for ransomware, outages, human error or data loss.
Measure MFA, administrator count, inactive accounts, access reviews, supplier access, device health, logs, backup and response time for compromised accounts.
Yes. Zero Trust provides practical evidence for ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2, DORA, cyber insurance and enterprise customers: MFA, access review, logs, supplier control, backup, monitoring and board decisions.
Zero Trust for SMEs does not have to be a complex enterprise project. The simplest rule is: do not automatically trust an account, device, network or supplier. Verify access, limit permissions, monitor actions and prepare incident response.
The best start is MFA, administrator review, inactive account removal, access review, supplier control, device security, backup and logs. These actions can be implemented in stages and materially reduce risk.
Zero Trust is not about making work harder. It is about ensuring that the right people have the right access at the right time, and that one account takeover does not mean takeover of the entire company.
How to Perform an Access Review in a Company?
An access review checks who has access to which systems, data, applications, administrative roles, service accounts and cloud resources, and whether that access is still needed. A good review ends with a decision: keep, reduce, remove, expire or move access into an approval process.
Prepared by: CCyber Editorial Team
An access review should answer one question: does every person, technical account, application, supplier and administrator have exactly the access they still need to work? The simplest process is: prepare the system list, export users and roles, assign business owners, assess access by risk, make decisions, remove unnecessary permissions and keep evidence. A good access review is not only an IT report. It is a business control that reduces the risk of account takeover, data leakage, ransomware, administrator misuse and audit findings.
July 2026
An access review is a control that checks whether users, administrators, suppliers, applications and technical accounts still have justified access to company systems, data and resources. The goal is to remove access that is no longer needed and reduce access that is too broad.
An access review should answer:
Simply put: an access review is access hygiene. Just as a company periodically checks finances, contracts and suppliers, it should periodically check who has access to data and systems.
Access grows over time. An employee changes team, receives new roles, replaces someone in a project, tests an application, helps during an outage, and old permissions remain. After months or years, many people have more access than they actually need.
This creates risk:
An access review reduces the attack surface. It does not prevent every incident, but it limits the impact of account takeover, human error and access misuse.
Frequency depends on risk. Critical systems and administrative roles should be reviewed more often than supporting applications.
Access should also be reviewed after events such as:
Review active employees, their roles, groups, applications and data access. Pay special attention to people who changed job, team or project.
A former employee should not have active access to email, cloud, CRM, repositories, VPN, social media, domain, hosting panel or SaaS applications.
Guests in Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Slack, Teams, SharePoint, GitHub, Jira or CRM often remain after cooperation ends. This is a common audit issue.
IT providers, software houses, agencies, integrators, accountants, consultants and support providers should have access only to what they need, only during cooperation and only through controlled accounts.
Administrator accounts are the riskiest. Review Global Administrators, cloud administrators, domain administrators, backup administrators, database administrators, repository owners and people who can grant access to others.
Do not review only users. Many permissions come from groups. Check who is in high-risk groups and whether groups are assigned to overly broad roles.
Service accounts, service principals, applications, bots, integrations, API tokens and automations may have broad permissions. Often nobody knows who owns them.
Review CRM, ERP, accounting, HR, project tools, marketing automation, helpdesk, electronic signature, cloud drives, AI tools and communication tools.
In Azure, AWS and Google Cloud, review subscription owners, IAM roles, groups, technical accounts, access keys, public access, cross-account access and data permissions.
Review access to folders with contracts, customer data, financial documentation, HR, source code, backup, technical documentation and strategic information.
First define what exactly you are reviewing. Do not try to review everything at once if the company has never done it before. Start with highest-risk systems.
Scope may include:
Evidence to prepare: access review scope card.
IT can prepare user exports, but it does not always know who truly needs access from a business perspective. The system owner or data owner should make the decision.
Example owners:
Evidence to prepare: system list with business and technical owners.
Prepare a list of users, groups, roles, technical accounts and applications. Without the current state, there is no reliable review.
The export should include:
Evidence to prepare: access state export as of the review start date.
Not every access has the same priority. Start with permissions whose misuse can cause the greatest harm.
Evidence to prepare: high-risk access list.
The system owner must know how to assess access. Without criteria, the review becomes subjective: “let’s keep it, maybe it will be useful”.
Evidence to prepare: access assessment rules and decision criteria.
System owners should confirm access. Ideally, each decision has a status and comment.
If the owner does not respond, do not leave it without a process. Define a rule: manager escalation, reminder, default decision for high-risk access or temporary block until clarified.
Evidence to prepare: system owner decision sheet.
A review without implemented changes has little value. After decisions, access must actually be removed, reduced or changed.
Document:
Evidence to prepare: register of changes made after the review.
Not every access can be removed immediately. Sometimes an exception is needed, but exceptions must be controlled.
An exception should have:
Evidence to prepare: access exception register.
The final report shows that the review was performed and produced results. It is a key document for audit, board, customer or insurer.
The report should include:
Evidence to prepare: final access review report.
An access review should not be a one-time project before an audit. It is a recurring control. After the first review, schedule the next ones.
Evidence to prepare: recurring access review schedule.
In Microsoft 365, administrative roles, groups, guests, SharePoint, Teams, Exchange, enterprise applications and access to sensitive data are especially important.
In cloud environments, access is often more complex than in office applications. Roles may be assigned at organization, account, subscription, project, resource, group or policy level.
Service accounts are often harder than human accounts. Nobody logs in manually, but applications, integrations, scripts and automations use them to work. They may have broad permissions and passwords that have not been rotated for years.
Evidence to prepare: service account, secret and owner register.
Suppliers often have access to systems, data and production environments. Supplier access review should be part of access review, especially when the company uses outsourced IT, MSPs, software houses, accountants, marketing agencies, consultants or integrators.
Evidence to prepare: supplier access register and owner decisions.
IT can prepare data and implement changes, but the business owner should confirm who really needs access.
The company performs a review but does not remove permissions. This creates a false sense of control and weak audit evidence.
Access that may be useful someday should usually be removed and granted again after approval if a real need appears.
Guests and partners often remain in systems long after cooperation ends. This is an easy-to-fix gap.
Service accounts may have more permissions than humans. Without an owner and secret rotation, they create high risk.
Reviewing a low-risk support application is less urgent than reviewing administrators, backup, cloud, finance and customer data.
The auditor will ask not only whether the review happened, but also who made decisions, what changed and which exceptions were accepted.
A one-time review before an audit helps only briefly. Access must be reviewed regularly because the organization changes constantly.
A services company has 80 employees and uses Microsoft 365, CRM, finance system, code repositories, Azure cloud and an external IT provider. Access reviews were performed only before audits, manually and without business owners.
The first real review shows that Microsoft 365 has six Global Administrators, two former suppliers still have guest accounts, the sales team has access to a folder with financial contracts, and a CRM integration service account has administrator permissions without an owner. Some users also have access to projects they have not worked on for over a year.
The company implements a simple process. IT prepares exports, system owners make decisions, and security maintains an exception register and final report. Within 60 days, the company removes former supplier access, reduces administrators, removes inactive accounts, cleans up groups and assigns owners to service accounts.
The result: fewer high-risk accounts, better audit evidence, lower data leakage risk and easier answers to enterprise customer questions. Access review becomes a quarterly control, not an emergency action before audit.
ccyber.io helps companies perform practical access reviews across Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, cloud, SaaS applications, critical systems and external supplier environments. We combine IAM, PAM, cloud security, compliance and audit perspectives.
We can support your organization with:
The best first step is an Access Review Discovery Workshop. In a short workshop, the company can determine which systems carry the highest risk, who should own decisions, which data must be exported and how to run the first review without chaos.
It is a process that checks who has access to systems, data, applications and roles, and whether that access is still needed and aligned with the user’s role.
High-risk access such as administrators, suppliers, customer data, backup and cloud should be reviewed monthly or quarterly. Other applications can be reviewed semiannually or annually depending on risk.
Ideally, the system owner or data owner. IT can prepare the report and implement changes, but the business decision should belong to the person responsible for the process.
Often yes. ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2, DORA, cyber insurance and customer requirements often expect access control, regular reviews and evidence of unnecessary permissions removed.
Start with administrators, former employee accounts, guests, suppliers, Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, backup, finance, CRM and customer data.
Yes. Service accounts often have broad permissions and unclear owners. They should have an owner, justification, permission scope, secret rotation and next review date.
Define an escalation rule. For high-risk access, lack of confirmation should not automatically mean keeping access unchanged.
Keep review scope, user and role exports, owner decisions, change list, exception register, access removal confirmations and final report.
Access review is one of the most important controls in identity, access and cloud security. It helps verify whether employees, administrators, suppliers, applications and service accounts still have access they truly need.
The best review starts with high-risk systems: administrators, cloud, backup, customer data, finance, HR, code repositories and suppliers. Then it requires owner decisions, implemented changes and retained evidence.
A company that regularly reviews access reduces the risk of account takeover, data leakage, access misuse and audit findings. The key is to make the review a recurring risk management process, not a one-time action before an audit.
IAM vs PAM: What Is the Difference and When Does a Company Need Both?
IAM manages identities and access for all users, applications, devices and technical accounts. PAM protects privileged access, including admin accounts, root, service accounts, secrets, technical sessions and high-risk actions. A company needs both when it has Microsoft 365, cloud, administrators, servers, databases, production systems, IT suppliers or audit requirements.
Prepared by: CCyber Editorial Team
IAM and PAM solve different problems. IAM, or Identity and Access Management, manages who can sign in, which systems they can access, MFA, SSO, roles, groups, provisioning, offboarding and access reviews. PAM, or Privileged Access Management, controls privileged access: administrator accounts, root, service accounts, technical passwords, secrets, administrator sessions, approvals, session recording, just-in-time access and audit of high-risk actions. IAM is the foundation of access control. PAM is an additional protection layer for the most dangerous permissions. A company needs both when a normal user account and an administrator account cannot be treated the same way.
July 2026
IAM, or Identity and Access Management, is a set of processes, tools and rules for managing identities and access in an organization. IAM covers users, administrators, employees, suppliers, partners, applications, devices, technical accounts and increasingly workload identities and AI agents.
IAM answers basic questions:
Examples of IAM functions:
IAM is the foundation of modern company security. Without IAM, the organization does not know who has access, why they have it and when it should be removed.
PAM, or Privileged Access Management, is a set of processes, tools and rules for controlling privileged access. Privileged access allows someone to change configuration, manage systems, read sensitive data, delete resources, grant permissions, disable controls or affect company operations.
PAM answers:
Examples of PAM functions:
PAM is especially important because compromising a privileged account can have much greater impact than compromising a normal user account.
Not all access is equal. A marketing employee with access to a campaign folder creates a different risk than an administrator with access to all Microsoft 365, a server, database, backups or production system.
Normal access allows everyday work: reading a file, sending email, using CRM, adding a note, working in an application or serving a customer.
Examples:
Privileged access allows changing systems, granting permissions, managing data, configuring controls, deleting resources or affecting other users’ access.
Examples:
IAM should control both types of access. PAM should additionally protect the second type because misuse can stop the company.
IAM can provide MFA, SSO, roles and application access. This is very important, but many privileged risks can remain.
IAM alone may not solve issues such as:
IAM says: the user is verified and has a role. PAM adds: does this person really need privileged access now, for how long, for what reason and can we prove it?
PAM does not replace IAM. A company may have a password vault, session recording and just-in-time access, but still have chaos in users, groups, roles, SaaS applications and offboarding.
PAM alone does not solve issues such as:
PAM protects the riskiest permissions. IAM organizes the whole identity and access layer.
A company needs IAM when it has more than a few people and more than a few applications. If access is granted manually, passwords are separate in every application and employee departure requires checking many systems, IAM becomes necessary.
A company needs PAM when it has accounts or actions whose misuse may cause serious consequences: downtime, data leakage, loss of backups, configuration change, cloud takeover, production disruption or audit problems.
A company needs both when it has everyday user access and risky administrative access. In practice, this applies to most companies using Microsoft 365, cloud, servers, IT suppliers or critical systems.
If the answer to one of these questions is “yes”, PAM should be on the roadmap:
If yes, normal IAM is not enough. A PAM layer is needed.
IAM:
PAM:
IAM:
PAM:
IAM:
PAM:
IAM:
PAM:
First, identify which identities exist. This is not only employees. Include administrators, guests, suppliers, service accounts, applications and automations.
Check:
Evidence to prepare: identity and technical account register.
A list of accounts without permissions is not enough. The company must know who has access to what and why.
Check:
Evidence to prepare: access map and high-risk permission list.
Without MFA and central sign-in, the company will struggle with access control. IAM should first secure the most important accounts and applications.
Priorities:
Evidence to prepare: MFA report, SSO application list and exception list.
Before implementing advanced PAM, the company should reduce the number of accounts with the highest privileges. Usually there are too many.
Review:
Evidence to prepare: administrative role report and decisions to reduce permissions.
An administrator does not need standing privileges 24 hours a day. In many cases, role activation for a specific task is enough.
JIT should include:
Evidence to prepare: JIT configuration and role activation report.
Privileged access is not only human accounts. It also includes passwords, tokens, API keys, certificates and secrets used by applications and automations.
Implement:
Evidence to prepare: secrets register, rotation policy and usage report.
For critical systems, knowing that an administrator signed in may not be enough. The company should know what the administrator did.
Session controls:
Evidence to prepare: privileged session report and review procedure.
Both IAM and PAM require regular reviews. Access that was needed three months ago may no longer be needed.
Review:
Evidence to prepare: access review report with decisions: keep, reduce, remove.
Zero Trust assumes that access should not be granted only because a user is inside the company network or uses a known device. Every access should be authenticated, authorized and evaluated contextually.
In this model:
Without IAM, the company has no central identity control. Without PAM, the company has insufficient control over the riskiest actions.
IAM and PAM are related but not the same. IAM manages identities and access broadly. PAM controls the riskiest permissions and actions.
Administrators should have stronger protection than normal users. They access the most sensitive configurations and data.
Standing administrator access increases risk. If the account is compromised, the attacker immediately has high privileges. Time-bound access reduces this problem.
A shared account makes audit difficult. After an incident, the company does not know which person performed the action. Administrative accounts should be named, and shared passwords should be vaulted and used only in controlled scenarios.
Service accounts often have high permissions, passwords without rotation and no owner. This is one of the most commonly missed PAM areas.
Suppliers should have access only for the time and systems needed for the task. Standing remote access without session recording and approval creates high risk.
Access accumulates over time. Without reviews, the company ends up with users who have more permissions than they need.
The company must have controlled emergency accounts. Otherwise, it may lock itself out during incorrect IAM or PAM configuration.
A SaaS company has 80 employees, Microsoft 365, Azure, GitHub, several databases, CI/CD system and an external IT provider. The company has MFA for most employees and SSO for some applications, so the board believes access is well secured.
A review shows that there are seven Global Administrators, administrators have standing roles, a CI/CD service account has broad permissions, passwords for several systems are stored in documentation, and the IT provider has permanent access to the environment. There is no session recording, access approval or service account review.
The company does not need to replace existing IAM. It needs to add a PAM layer. In the first 30 days, it reduces administrator roles, strengthens MFA and creates a privileged account register. In 60 days, it moves passwords into a vault, organizes service accounts and limits supplier access. In 90 days, it implements JIT for high-risk roles, access reviews and a procedure for administrator account compromise.
The result is practical: IAM continues to manage users and applications, while PAM reduces administrative action risk. The company also has stronger evidence for customers, audits and cyber insurance.
ccyber.io helps companies organize IAM and PAM in a practical, risk-based way aligned with the real environment. We do not start from buying a tool. We start from who has access to what, which accounts are privileged and where one account can cause the greatest damage.
We can support your organization with:
The best first step is a short IAM/PAM Discovery Workshop. It quickly identifies the biggest risks: administrators, service accounts, suppliers, cloud, Microsoft 365, backup, code repositories or production systems.
IAM manages identities and access for all users, applications and technical accounts. PAM manages privileged access, meaning accounts and sessions that can change systems, data, configurations and permissions.
PAM can be treated as a specialist layer within the broader identity and access area. In practice, PAM has its own processes, tools and controls because privileged access requires stronger oversight.
No. MFA is important, but PAM includes more: JIT, approvals, password rotation, vaulting, session recording, activity audit, service accounts, secrets and supplier control.
A small company needs PAM if it has Microsoft 365 administrators, servers, databases, backup, cloud, an IT provider with remote access or a system whose compromise could stop operations.
Start with a central user directory, MFA, SSO for key applications, offboarding process and regular access reviews.
Start with the list of privileged accounts, limiting administrators, separate administrator accounts, MFA, password vaulting, supplier control and time-bound access for high-risk roles.
Yes. Service accounts often have high privileges, passwords without rotation and no owner. They should be covered by a register, review, secret rotation and usage monitoring.
Yes. IAM and PAM provide evidence for ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2, DORA and customer audits: MFA, access reviews, roles, offboarding, JIT, approvals, logs, sessions and supplier control.
IAM and PAM do not compete. IAM is the foundation for managing identities and access across the company. PAM is the protection layer for privileged access that can cause the greatest damage.
A company needs IAM when it wants to know who has access to applications, data and systems. A company needs PAM when it wants to control administrators, service accounts, secrets, suppliers, technical sessions and high-risk actions.
The best approach is to implement IAM as the baseline: MFA, SSO, lifecycle, roles and access reviews. Then add PAM where risk is highest: administrators, cloud, Microsoft 365, backup, production, servers, databases, CI/CD and suppliers. This means the company does not only sign users in, but actually controls the most dangerous permissions.
The Most Common Microsoft 365 Security Mistakes
Microsoft 365 can be a very secure environment, but only when it is configured properly. The most common mistakes are incomplete MFA, too many administrators, legacy authentication, weak Conditional Access, poor sharing settings, missing SPF, DKIM and DMARC, insufficient email protection, lack of audit review, no data classification and no regular Secure Score review.
Prepared by: CCyber Editorial Team
The most common Microsoft 365 security mistakes usually come not from missing tools, but from missing configuration, ownership and regular review. Companies often have Microsoft 365, but not full MFA, legacy authentication blocking, organized administrator roles, secure SharePoint and OneDrive sharing settings, properly configured SPF, DKIM and DMARC, preset security policies, auditing, data classification or an account compromise response plan. The best start is a Microsoft 365 security review, quick closure of identity risks and regular Microsoft Secure Score review.
July 2026
Microsoft 365 is the work center of many companies. One environment contains email, documents, Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, user accounts, application access, customer data and often integrations with other systems.
For an attacker, compromising a Microsoft 365 account may provide access to:
Microsoft 365 should therefore be treated as a critical system. It is not only email and office apps. It is a platform for identity, communication, data and collaboration.
The most common mistake is believing that MFA is enabled while it only works for some users or selected scenarios. Often, the board and IT have MFA, but shared accounts, finance, generic mailboxes, suppliers or legacy apps do not.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: MFA registration report, exception list and report on MFA methods used by users.
Security Defaults are baseline Microsoft Entra ID security settings. In many companies, they are disabled because they blocked one scenario, but no strong Conditional Access policies are implemented instead.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: Security Defaults or Conditional Access configuration export, policy list, exception list and policy impact test result.
Legacy authentication means older login methods that do not support modern security mechanisms such as MFA. If still allowed, they may weaken the whole MFA rollout.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: legacy authentication usage report and policy blocking older protocols.
Global Administrator is one of the most privileged roles in Microsoft 365. In many companies, too many people have this role, sometimes including accounts used for daily work.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: administrator role list, access justifications and role review report.
Companies often secure administrators but forget about emergency scenarios: incorrect Conditional Access configuration, MFA failure, identity provider issue or all administrators being locked out.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: emergency account procedure, test confirmation and account usage alerts.
Conditional Access can significantly improve security, but only if designed well. The mistake is both having no policies and having too many inconsistent policies, exceptions and manual workarounds.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: Conditional Access policy register, mode, owner, scope and exception list.
Email is one of the most important entry points. Microsoft 365 provides anti-spam, anti-malware, anti-phishing and advanced Microsoft Defender for Office 365 capabilities, but many companies do not configure them deliberately.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: email protection policy report, user scope and phishing reporting configuration.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC help protect the email domain against spoofing. Missing records or poor configuration increase the risk of phishing from fake addresses that look like the company domain.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: SPF, DKIM, DMARC records, sending source list and DMARC report.
SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams make collaboration easy, but poor sharing settings can cause accidental data exposure. “Anyone” links, no expiration, broad permissions and no guest review are especially risky.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: sharing settings export, guest list and external links report.
If the company does not classify data, users often do not know which documents are public, internal, confidential or critical. Microsoft Purview sensitivity labels can help classify, mark, encrypt and control access to content.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: data classification policy, label list and sensitivity label usage report.
Microsoft 365 can generate many audit events, but having logs is not enough. The company must know who can access logs, how long they are retained, which events are reviewed and what to do after a suspected incident.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: audit configuration report, list of people with log access and incident analysis procedure.
Microsoft 365 is a cloud service, but users access it through laptops, phones and browsers. If devices are outdated, unsecured or personal without control, session takeover and data leakage risk increases.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: device list, compliance status, device policy and report of devices accessing Microsoft 365.
A former employee, external consultant or guest account may remain active long after cooperation ends. In Microsoft 365, this affects not only user accounts, but also Teams, SharePoint, groups and files.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: offboarding checklist, inactive account report and guest list with latest review.
Microsoft Secure Score helps show security recommendations and progress, but it should not be the only security measure. A high score does not guarantee no risk, and not every recommendation fits every company.
Risk:
What to do:
Evidence to prepare: monthly Secure Score report, risk acceptance decisions and action list with owners.
A services company has 85 employees and uses Microsoft 365 Business Premium. The board believes the environment is secure because the company uses Microsoft cloud and MFA “was enabled at some point”.
A review shows that MFA does not cover all users, legacy authentication still appears in logs, there are six Global Administrators, some use administrator accounts for daily email, and “Anyone” links are available in several SharePoint sites. Additionally, the domain has SPF but no correctly deployed DKIM and DMARC.
The company does not need a huge project at the start. In the first 30 days, it secures administrators, organizes MFA, checks Secure Score and enables baseline email policies. In 60 days, it blocks legacy authentication, reduces Global Administrators, configures SPF, DKIM and DMARC, and reviews sharing. In 90 days, it implements guest review, account compromise procedure and board reporting.
The result is practical: the company detects suspicious sign-ins faster, reduces phishing risk, limits accidental data sharing and has evidence for customers and audits.
ccyber.io helps companies review and improve Microsoft 365 security in a practical, business-focused way matched to licensing and risk. The goal is not only to increase Secure Score. The goal is to reduce account takeover, phishing, data leakage, administrator error and access control risk.
We can support your organization with:
The best first step is a short Microsoft 365 security assessment. It helps identify which settings are critical, where the biggest gaps are and which actions provide the highest impact in the shortest time.
Microsoft 365 has many security features, but the environment still requires proper configuration. The most important areas are MFA, administrator roles, Conditional Access, email protection, sharing, audit and monitoring.
The most common major mistake is incomplete MFA and excessive administrator permissions. One compromised account may then give an attacker broad access to the environment.
For many smaller organizations, Security Defaults are a good starting point. Companies with more complex requirements should consider Conditional Access, but should not disable Security Defaults without replacing them with other controls.
Older authentication protocols do not support modern security controls such as MFA. If active, they can weaken account protection and increase password attack risk.
Yes, these are core mechanisms for protecting an email domain against spoofing. They should be deployed deliberately, monitored and gradually moved toward stronger DMARC enforcement.
No. Secure Score is a very useful tool for recommendations and progress tracking, but it does not replace risk analysis, configuration audit and business decisions.
A baseline review should be performed at least quarterly, while Secure Score and alerts should be checked more frequently. Administrator roles, guests, external links and policy exceptions should have a regular control cycle.
Start with MFA, administrators, legacy authentication, Security Defaults or Conditional Access, email protection, SPF/DKIM/DMARC and external sharing review in SharePoint and OneDrive.
The most common Microsoft 365 security mistakes do not come from platform limitations, but from missing configuration and regular oversight. Microsoft 365 can be a very strong environment, but it requires deliberate protection of identity, email, data, sharing, logs and devices.
The key actions are full MFA, blocking legacy authentication, limiting administrators, strong Conditional Access or Security Defaults, email protection, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, external sharing control, auditing and regular Secure Score review.
Good Microsoft 365 configuration is not a one-time project. It is a recurring process: review settings, close gaps, document exceptions, exercise account compromise response and report risk to the board.
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